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Abstract—In this paper, we present a novel fault tolerance
design technique, which is applicable at the register transfer
level, based on protecting the functionality of logic circuits using
a probabilistic fault model. The proposed technique selects the
most susceptible workload of combinational circuits to protect
against probabilistic faults. The workload susceptibility is ranked
as the likelihood of any fault to bypass the inherent logical
masking of the circuit and propagate an erroneous response to its
outputs, when that workload is executed. The workload protec-
tion is achieved through a Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)
scheme by using the patterns that have been evaluated as most
susceptible. We apply the proposed technique on LGSynth91 and
ISCAS85 benchmarks and evaluate its fault tolerance capabilities
against errors induced by permanent faults and soft errors. We
show that the proposed technique, when it is applied to protect
only the 32 most susceptible patterns, achieves on average of all
the examined benchmarks, an error coverage improvement of
98% and 94% against errors induced by single stuck-at faults
(permanent faults) and soft errors (transient faults), respectively,
compared to a reduced TMR scheme that protects the same
number of susceptible patterns without ranking them.
Index Terms—fault tolerance, susceptible workload, TMR,
output deviations, error detection, permanent & transient faults
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the advantages provided by technology scaling,
hardware reliability has been significantly affected. Devices
manufactured using 32nm technologies and below are more
prone to all sources of instability and noise [1] due to the
elevated cost for mitigating process variability [2]. Device
characteristics are also degrading in time due to the escalation
of aging mechanisms [3]. As a result, transient and permanent
faults of Integrated Circuits (ICs) can appear in-the-field, and
techniques to detect them are required.
Fault tolerant IC design techniques such as hardware redun-
dancy [4], and error correcting codes, appeared as a solution
for enhancing circuit reliability. Hardware redundancy consists
of the complete or partial replication of a circuit in order
to ensure correct functionality. By replicating the circuit, the
reliability is increased as it is highly unlikely that an error
would occur on every replica at the same time. Triple Modular
Redundancy (TMR) utilizes two replicas of the original circuit,
whose outputs are passed on to a majority voter [4]. TMR has
been most widely used for safety-critical applications where
robustness and data integrity are the top priority. Although
TMR achieves a high level of reliability, it imposes a high
area and power overhead, 200% of the original circuit plus
the voter circuits, and is therefore non-viable for low power
mainstream applications. Selective hardening and Selective
Fault Tolerance (SFT) have been proposed as a means of
reducing area overhead and power consumption, while en-
hancing the reliability of circuits, when TMR is deemed too
costly. Selective hardening aims to protect the most vulnerable
parts of a circuit against soft errors and has been achieved in
microprocessors [5], [6] through the architecture vulnerability
factor of state elements. Selective hardening has also been
achieved by propagating signal probabilities at the RT-Level
to estimate the likelihood of an erroneous system output
caused by soft errors, to select vulnerable logic blocks or
nodes to protect [7], [8]. On the other hand, Selective fault
tolerance (SFT) as introduced by [9], [10], ensures functional
protection using a reduced TMR system, when is stimulated
by pre-selected input patterns. Previous works on SFT rely
on randomly selecting input vectors of a combinational circuit
and guaranteeing protection only for these input patterns.
However, in the presence of a fault, not all input patterns are
equally susceptible to it. Some patterns are less protected by
the inherent logical masking of a circuit. When such patterns
are executed in the presence of faults, the probability that the
logical masking of circuits will be bypassed and an erroneous
response will be generated is higher. Such patterns are defined
as the susceptible workload.
Probabilistic fault models were developed for ranking test
patterns according to their ability to sensitize the logic cones
of a circuit that are more susceptible to propagate an erroneous
response. Probabilistic fault models are known for enriching
both the modelled and the un-modelled defect coverage of
tests, without being biased towards any particular fault model.
Output deviations (OD) [11], [12], is an RT-Level fault model
calibrated through technology failure information that stems
from technology reliability characterization, such as inductive
fault analysis [13]. It is utilized for selecting the input patterns
that maximize the probability of propagating an erroneous
response to the primary outputs. The input patterns with the
highest output deviations have a greater ability to penetrate
the inherent logical masking of the circuit. [14] shows that
selecting input patterns with high output deviations tends to
provide more effective error detection capabilities than tradi-
tional fault models. In [12], a test set enrichment technique for
the selection of test patterns is proposed. Output deviations
have also been used for enriching the unmodelled defect
coverage of tests during x-filling [15], linear [16], [17], [18]
and statistical [19] compression.
In this paper we propose a novel selective fault tolerance
design technique based on the probabilistic fault model of
output deviations. Contrary to previous SFT techniques, which
protect unranked susceptible input combinations, the proposed
probabilistic selective fault tolerance design technique (PSFT),
protects the most susceptible input patterns of combinational
circuits, which are selected based on a ranking metric ac-
cording to maximizing the circuit output deviations. This
paper is organized as follows. Section II presents an overview
of previous works on Selective Fault Tolerance and reviews
the probabilistic fault model of output deviations. Section
III describes the PSFT design technique. Simulation results
of applying this technique to a set of the LGSynth91 and
ISCAS85 benchmarks are shown in Section IV, where it is
shown that when the most susceptible workload is protected,
then the protection of any workload of the circuit is also
enriched against permanent and transient faults. Simulation
results of applying this technique to a set of the LGSynth91
benchmarks are shown in Section IV. Finally, the concluding
remarks are presented in Section V.
II. MOTIVATION
In this section, the concept of Selective Fault Tolerance
and the probabilistic fault model of output deviations (OD)
are reviewed. The effectiveness of OD in detecting errors
compared to the random selection of input patterns is presented
as a motivational experiment.
A. Selective Fault Tolerance
Selective Fault Tolerance (SFT) was proposed as a mod-
ification of TMR. SFT reduces TMR cost by protecting the
functionality of the circuit for only a subset of input patterns
[9]. This input pattern subset X1 is selected randomly by
the system designer. The input patterns within the subset are
ensured to be protected with the same level of reliability of
TMR, while the rest are not guaranteed protection.
Figure 1 depicts the existing technique of SFT. For a
combinational circuit S1=S to be protected using SFT, two
smaller circuits s2 and s3 need to be generated. The behaviour
of circuits s2 and s3 with a protected set of X1 is described
as follows:
S(x) = S1(x) = s2(x) = s3(x), x ∈ X1 (1)
(S1(x) = s2(x)) ∨ (S1(x) = s3(x)), x /∈ X1 (2)
To determine if the input x falls within the protected set













Fig. 1. Previous Selective Fault Tolerance architecture
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. Output deviations example [11]: (a) simple circuit with confidence
level vectors and (b) propagated output deviations
output of this function is passed on to a modified majority
voter as shown in Figure 1, where the outputs of s2 and s3
are considered if and only if χ(x)=1, otherwise the output of
the TMR system is the output of circuit S1.
χ(x) =
{
1 x ∈ X1
0 x /∈ X1
A simplified method for SFT was proposed in [20], where
the circuits s2 and s3 are replaced by identical circuits. These
circuits are the minimal combinational circuits that for an input
pattern within the protected set X1, exhibit the same output
as the original circuit S1. The system can be described in the
following form: (not care indicates undefined values).
S(x) = S1(x) = s2(x) = s3(x), x ∈ X1 (3)
(s2(x) = not care) ∧ (s3(x) = not care), x /∈ X1 (4)
B. Probabilistic Fault Model: Output Deviations
The selection of input patterns with high output deviations
tends to provide more effective error detection capabilities than
traditional fault models [14]. The Output deviations are used
to rank patterns according to their likelihood of propagating an
logic error. There are a few requirements to compute the output
deviations of an input pattern. First, a confidence level vector
is assigned to each gate in the circuit. The confidence level Rk
of a gate Gk with N inputs and one output is a vector with 2N




k , · · · , r11...11k )
where each rxx...xxk denotes the probability that Gk’s output
is correct for the corresponding input pattern. The actual
probability values can be generated from various sources,
e.g., inductive fault analysis, layout information or transistor-
level failure probabilities. In this paper, the probability values
obtained by inductive fault analysis shown in [11] are used.
Propagation of signal probabilities in the circuit follows
the principle shown in [21], with no consideration for signal
correlation to reduce computation complexity. The signal
probabilities pk,0 and pk,1 are associated to each net k in the
circuit. By unitarity: pk,0 + pk,1=1. In the case of a NAND
gate Gk with inputs a, b and output z the propagation of signal




























The same principle is applied to compute the signal prob-
abilities for all gate types. For any gate G, let its fault-free
output value for any input pattern tj be d, d ∈ (0, 1). The
output deviation ∆Gj of G for input pattern tj is defined as
pGd¯, where d¯ is the complement of d (d¯ = 1 − d). In other
words, the output deviation of an input pattern is a measure of
TABLE I
MEASURED STUCK-AT FAULT COVERAGE AND SUSCEPTIBILITY TO BIT
FLIPS BETWEEN PROBABILISTIC AND RANDOM PATTERNS FOR pdc
patterns Fault Coverage (%) Impr. (%) Suscept. to bit flips (%) Impr. (%)rp pp rp pp
8 4.9 14.2 189.4 0.4 1.9 375
16 5.3 19.6 268.6 1.6 3.3 106.3
32 6.5 26.6 311.1 2.6 4.8 84.7
64 9.7 33.7 247.9 5.1 9.4 84.3
128 21.6 42.1 94.7 10.1 16.3 61.4
256 22.4 49.8 122.1 20.8 29.6 42.3
512 37.0 56.2 51.9 45.3 57.3 26.5
1024 39.0 61.8 58.5 88.3 93.5 5.9
the likelihood that the gate output is incorrect due to a fault
in the circuit, but unbiased towards any fault model [11].
Example: Figure 2 shows a circuit with a confidence level
vector associated with each gate. The table contains three
input patterns and their output deviations. The first column
contains the input pattern (a, b, c, d), along with the expected
fault-free output value z. The next columns show the signal
probabilities for both logic ’0’ and ’1’ of the two internal
nets and the primary output (e, f, z). The output deviation
of a pattern is the likelihood that an incorrect value is
observed at the output z. Therefore the output deviations (the
erroneous behaviour in G3) for the presented input patterns
are: ∆3,0000 = pz,1, ∆3,0101 = pz,1, ∆3,1111 = pz,0. In
this example, the input pattern 1111 has the greatest output
deviation, with a probability of observing a 0 (the erroneous
value) at z of pz,0=0.396, thus offering the highest likelihood
of detecting an error. •
Table I presents the results of a motivational experiment to
show that different patterns exhibit different susceptibility to
permanent and transient faults. We select two sets of patterns.
The first is random patterns (rp) and the second one is selected
based on the probabilistic fault model of output deviations (pp)
[11] for the combinational circuit pdc from the LGSynth91
benchmarks. For this experiment we generate rp and pp sets
by gradually increasing the size of the sets from 8 to 1024
patterns. The values presented of the random patterns, under
(rp) columns), are obtained using the average results of 30
different sets. The first column shows the size of the rp
and pp sets. The next columns show the fault coverage of
the rp and the pp, respectively, against permanent faults, by
deploying fault simulation to compute the fault coverage of
the sets against stuck-at faults. Thus, these results represent
the ratio of faults which affect the operation of the circuit
for the examined input patterns. Note that the pp set was
obtained using random patterns and ranking [11] them without
considering initial patterns that are generated for stuck-at
faults, thus they are not biased towards stuck-at faults. Column
‘Impr.’, shows the higher susceptibility of pp against rp for
permanent faults in the range [51.9% 311.1%], as expected.
The next column presents the susceptibility of the sets of
patterns against transient faults. This evaluation is conducted
by flipping a single bit (yet examining all the possible bit flips)
at every input pattern and observing, if this error is propagated














Fig. 3. Proposed Probabilistic Selective Fault Tolerance design
logic masking of the circuit. The values depicted are the
percentage of bit flips at the primary inputs that successfully
bypassed circuit’s logical masking. Note that even for transient
faults, pp set exhibit higher sensitivity [5.9% 375%], which is
shown under column ‘Impr.’, against the rp set.
III. PROPOSED PSFT DESIGN TECHNIQUE
This section describes the proposed Probabilistic Selective
Fault Tolerance (PSFT) design technique.
A. Concept
The PSFT design is presented in Figure 3. Similar to
previous SFT techniques, the design consists of a reduced
TMR system with the original circuit U , two smaller redundant
circuits UP , and a ZP characteristic function that validates
when the inputs of the UP units belong to the protected input
set. The original circuit U receives all the inputs, while the UP
and ZP unit inputs are those that affect the selected logic cones
determined by the desired minimum protected susceptibility γ.
A majority voter VP is used at the outputs of the circuit the
output of which is selected only when the ZP=1.
B. Proposed PSFT design flow
Figure 4 presents the flow diagram for the proposed PSFT
design technique. The technique requires the number of pat-
terns to protect (N ) and minimum protected susceptibility (γ)
constraints. N is defined as the number of the most susceptible
patterns to protect and γ as the minimum protected suscep-
tibility. γ ensures that the most vulnerable logic cones are
protected in descending order and enables a trade-off between
area overhead and fault tolerance, which is explored in Section
IV. The proposed technique consists of three processes. First,
the maximum output deviations of all cones are computed.
The logic cone selection normalises the maximum output
deviations and returns those with their normalised maximum
output deviations >= γ. The pattern ranking computes the
output deviations of a large number of patterns and ranks
them accordingly. The patterns whose output deviations are
closest to the maximum are the highest ranked. The top N
ranked patterns are selected for protection and presented in
PLA form for synthesis using ABC [22].
1) Process 1 (Compute maximum output deviations): The
PSFT technique reads the RTL netlist and computes the
maximum output deviations per logic cone. This is achieved by
computing the output deviations of a large number of random
patterns (100K) and marking the maximum observed output
deviations per cone for every observable fault-free logic value.
Process 1




















Fig. 4. Proposed design technique flow diagram
2) Process 2 (Logic cone selection): Computing the output
deviations allows for the identification and selection of the
logic cones that provide the highest likelihood of detecting
logic errors. The logic cones are selected according to their
maximum output deviations. Those cones whose normalised
maximum output deviations (NMOD) is equal or greater than
the minimum protected susceptibility γ will be selected. That





Example: Figure 5 depicts the logic cone selection according
to their NMOD. The 4-input 3-output circuit is divided into
three overlapping sections. Each section depicts a logic cone
from inputs to outputs. The red section corresponds to the logic
cone of output Z1 with NMOD of 1.0. blue to Z2 with NMOD
of 0.8 and green to Z3 with NMOD of 0.2. If the desired γ
is 1 then only the logic cone of output Z1 would be selected.
With γ=0.7, the leftmost two cones are to be selected. Finally,
with γ=0.1 all three cones would be selected. •
The logic cone selection based on NMOD is dependant on
the constraint γ. As γ gets closer to 1.0, the amount of selected
cones is reduced discarding those with a smaller NMOD,
that is, the less vulnerable cones. A trade-off analysis of area
overhead vs γ is presented in Section IV.
3) Process 3 (Pattern ranking and pattern selection): The
output deviations of a large number of patterns are computed
and those with their output deviation at the protected cones the












Fig. 5. Example of logic cone selection with different NMOD














Fig. 6. Simulation Setup
TABLE II
BENCHMARK CIRCUIT INPUTS/OUTPUTS AND GATES
Benchmark I/O Gates Benchmark I/O Gates
pdc 16/40 806 t481 16/1 389
table3 14/14 445 c880 60/26 383
ex5 8/63 256 c3540 50/22 1699
The highest ranked patterns are selected. This process is
repeated until the desired number of patterns (N) have been
selected, producing the protected input set.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section presents the simulation results of applying
this technique on a subset of combinational circuits of the
LGSynth91 and ISCAS85 benchmark suites (Table II). The
simulation setup is described and a comparison of the error
coverage of random vs probabilistic patterns is shown. The
area overhead of the PSFT technique and a trade-off analysis
for a different number of patterns (N) and minimum protected
susceptibility (γ) are presented.
Figure 6 shows the simulation setup deployed to evaluate the
error coverage of the proposed technique against permanent
and transient faults. The most susceptible patterns are syn-
thesized using the ABC [22] synthesis tool into the proposed
reduced TMR scheme (Figure 3), the protected netlist by the
proposed technique is then evaluated using single Stuck-At
fault injections to obtain the induced by Single Stuck-At error
coverage (ibSSA EC) of the proposed technique, which is
shown in Figure 6. Transient fault analysis is also conducted,
by injecting soft errors induced by bit flips (ibBF) at the inputs
of the circuit. The soft error coverage (SEC) is computed
by injecting 50k such random upsets. The transient fault
simulation consists on finding 50K combinations of random
input patterns and single bit flips such that the output of the
unprotected circuit (U) is affected by the bit flip at the primary
input. The SEC is the percentage of these upsets that are not
affecting the protected circuit.
Table III presents the comparison of the ibSSA EC in block
U of the random patterns (U(rp)) and the ranked probabilistic
patterns (U(pp)) obtained for the selected benchmark circuits.
Data in U(rp) column is the average of 30 different random
patterns selections. The U(pp) column shows the ibSSA error
coverage of the ranked of the ranked by the proposed technique
patterns. The Impr (%) column shows the improvement of the
U(pp) over the U(rp) calculated as: Impr=(Upp − Urp)/Urp.
Note that the U(pp) consistently exhibit a higher ibSSA EC
than the U(rp). This improvement saturates while the number
of patterns N that is protected increases. This is attributed
to the increased probability that the random patterns U(rp)
contain highly susceptible patterns. However, the saturation
point depends on the size of the design, and for larger designs
occurs at higher N values, which should be avoided, due to
the high area cost associated with protecting large workloads
using TMR.
Figure 7 presents the resulting ibSSA error coverage (EC)
and area overhead of the PSFT design for the circuit c880.
The results for a different number of protected patterns (N)
are shown for minimum protected susceptibility γ=1. This
indicates that the selected logic cones will be those with a
normalised maximum output deviations = 1. The left axis
corresponds to the ibSSA error coverage and the right axis
to the area overhead of the proposed PSFT design. The area
overhead of the proposed PSFT design is the sum of the area
costs of the three blocks (U , UP & ZP ) depicted in Figure 3
divided by the size of the original circuit: (2·UP +ZP )/U . For
the scope of this paper the cost of the voters will be ignored.
Similar to the results shown in Table III, the ibSSA EC of the
pp is consistently higher than that the one of the rp for all
examined N values.
The computation of the ibSSA EC of the PSFT design is
calculated by adding the coverage in each of the blocks of the
design. The EC in the original circuit U is obtained by the
protected patterns (U(pp)). The coverage of the UP and ZP
blocks is 100%, as the protected patterns sensitize them fully.
The ibSSA EC of the PSFT design is computed as: PSFT =
(100 · (2· | UP | + | ZP |) + U(pp)· | U |)/(2· | UP | + | ZP |
+ | U |), where | U |, | Up |, and | ZP | are the sizes of the
blocks depicted in Figure 3.
Table IV shows the SEC improvement of pp over rp, area
overhead, ibSSA EC and TMR area improvement when only
the most vulnerable logic cones are selected (γ=1) for 8 and
32 protected patterns. For the SEC results, only bit flips that
affect the logic cones selected using a γ=1 are used to calculate
the masking capabilities of this technique. The second column
shows the SEC improvement calculated by the input bit flip
TABLE III
IMPROVEMENT OF ERROR COVERAGE (EC) INDUCED BY SINGLE
STUCK-AT FAULTS (IBSSA)
ex5 pdc
patterns ibSSA EC (%) Impr (%) ibSSA EC (%) Impr (%)
U(rp) U(pp) U(rp) U(pp)
2 15.5 16.4 5.8 2.3 5.1 122.3
16 47.7 59.3 24.3 5.3 19.6 268.6
128 75.2 79.9 6.3 21.6 42.1 94.7
1024 84.0 91.0 8.4 39.0 61.8 58.5
t481 table3
patterns ibSSA EC (%) Impr (%) ibSSA EC (%) Impr (%)
U(rp) U(pp) U(rp) U(pp)
2 12.4 12.5 0.8 2.6 6.1 134.4
16 23.8 28.1 18.0 11.2 28.5 155.5
128 45.2 47.0 4.0 33.0 51.5 56.3
1024 61.7 62.0 0.5 74.5 76.9 3.3
c3540 c880
patterns ibSSA EC (%) Impr (%) ibSSA EC (%) Impr (%)
U(rp) U(pp) U(rp) U(pp)
2 16.1 18.8 17 22.5 39.5 75.8
16 45.1 50.1 11.6 62.5 76.5 22.3
128 71.5 79 11 84.2 95.7 13.6

















































Number of Patterns (N)
Proposed Area Cost TMR Area Overhead
rp ibSSA error coverage pp ibSSA error coverage
Fig. 7. Area overhead of Benchmark c880 with minimum protected suscep-
tibility γ=1
simulation ([SECpp-SECrp]/SECrp). The ibSSA EC U(pp) &
U(rp) of the original circuit U and the improvement of U(pp)
over U(rp) are presented in the next three columns. Followed
by the total ibSSA EC of the whole PSFT design. The area
overhead of each of the blocks UP , ZP (Figure 3) and of
the full system are shown in the following three columns.
The improvement in area overhead over TMR is presented
in the last column, which is calculated as TMRimpr = 200 -
PSFTarea. The table shows an average ibSSA EC of 63% with
an average improvement of 98% of U(pp) over U(rp), and an
average SEC improvement of 94%. When only 32 patterns are
protected, we observe an area cost in the range of 18-103%
for all circuits, which corresponds to a 97-181% reduction
compared to TMR. Note that for circuit c880, using only the 32
patterns with the highest output deviations provides an ibSSA
EC of 89% with an area overhead of only 20%. c880 exhibited
on average a SEC of 4.47% for rp and of 7.49% for pp, an
improvement of 68%. The logic cones selected with γ=1 have
an input space of 210 (10 inputs), therefore, with just 32 out
of 210 patterns (32/210 = 3.13%), the proposed technique can
cover 7.49% of bit flips at the inputs. Circuit ex5 exhibit a
large SEC improvement compared to the other benchmarks
due the small input space (28), which allows for a simpler
identification pp with higher coverage than rp.
Figure 8 presents the trade-off between area overhead of the
TABLE IV
PERMANENT AND SOFT ERROR COVERAGE, AREA OVERHEAD AND THE
IMPROVEMENT OVER TMR OF THE PROPOSED TECHNIQUE WITH γ = 1.0
γ = 1, N=8 SEC ibSSA EC (%) Area overhead (%) TMR
Benchmark Impr.(%) U(pp) U(rp) Impr.(%) PSFT UP ZP PSFT Impr.(%)
pdc 71 14 4 189 20 2 3 7 193
table3 45 19 7 154 26 3 4 10 190
ex5 232 44 33 34 48 5 1 11 189
t481 50 21 18 15 32 6 4 16 184
c880 55 63 60 6 67 4 9 16 184
Average 91 32 25 80 39 4 4 12 188
γ = 1, N=32 SEC ibSSA EC (%) Area overhead (%) TMR
Benchmark Impr.(%) U(pp) U(rp) Impr.(%) PSFT UP ZP PSFT Impr.(%)
pdc 75 27 6 311 38 4 11 18 182
table3 25 37 15 140 48 8 9 25 175
ex5 267 71 61 17 76 10 4 24 176
t481 33 34 30 11 65 33 36 103 97
c880 68 86 78 10 89 8 4 20 180























Minimum protected susceptibility (γ)
64 protected patterns 256 protected patterns
TMR Cost
Fig. 8. Area overhead of different (γs) for benchmark pdc
PSFT design and different minimum protected susceptibilities
(γ) values for the circuit pdc. The area overhead of the
protected patterns N = 64 and N = 256 are shown for all γ
values. With a γ=0, all the logic cones are selected, similarly
when γ is 1, only the cones with NMOD = 1 are chosen. That
is, only the cones that show the maximum output deviations
of the circuit. When γ=0, the PSFT design is synthesized for
all cones, which yields a high area overhead even for a small
number of patterns. This is due to the intrinsic logic sharing
present in most circuits which the synthesis tool is then unable
to simply. It can be seen as expected, that for both N = 64 and
N = 256, the area overhead decreases until reaching a γ=1.
Note that for both 256 and 64 protected patterns, the area
overhead for γ = 0 is 176% and 110% respectively, which
decreases to 57% and 28% for γ=1.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We showed that not all input patterns of combinational
circuits are equally susceptible to permanent or transient faults
and that some patterns are less protected by the inherent logical
masking of the circuit (Table I). By combining the technique
of Selective Fault Tolerance (Fig. 1) and a probabilistic fault
model based on the theory of output deviations (Fig. 2), we
proposed a novel RTL-based selective fault tolerance design
technique (Fig. 3 & 4). The proposed technique selects the
most susceptible patterns and protects them using a reduced
TMR scheme. We evaluated the fault tolerance capabilities of
the proposed technique against errors induced by permanent
faults (single stuck-at faults) and transient faults (bit flips) on
a set of benchmarks (Table II). Trade-offs between achieved
tolerance against permanent faults (Table III) and transient
faults (Table IV) together with area overhead (Fig. 8) are
also demonstrated. The fault tolerance evaluation of workload
was conducted using random patterns that are not biased
towards any fault model and are not explicitly protected by the
proposed technique. Hence, we conclude that the protection
of the most susceptible workload of combinational circuits
through a probabilistic fault model that is not biased towards
any type of faults, ensures that the fault tolerance against any
fault model is also enriched.
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